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ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS OF
CORPORATE AGENTS
ELLA E A. HARPER
Men have always performed acts through others which
they might well have performed for themselves. The rights and
liabilities of the various parties involved in such transactions
have given rise to the law of Agency. The agent is circum-
scribed by certain well recognized limitations. He may have
general powers conferred upon him to enable him to do anything
which his principal might do. He may act only by special au-
thority, under which he may speak when, and only when speech
is a part of the act which he is commissioned to perform.'
Sometimes words are spoken which are not authorized and
which have therefore no direct relation to the subject-matter of
the agency, and are germane to the acts authorized only indi-
rectly. To establish the rights and liabilities of the parties in-
volved in such transactions, these spoken words are often of
vital importance. Here the law of Agency comes into contact
with the law of Evidence. In the light of the rules of both
branches of the law, when may the spoken words of the agent
be admitted to establish the liability of the principal to third
parties?
'See Fairlie v. Hastings, io Ves. Jr. 123 (I8o4). Cf. i GREENLEA, Evx-
DENcE (i6th ed. 1899) § 184 c.
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When the agent whose words are sought to be introduced
in evidence is one who acts for a corporation, the question is
still further complicated. Here the legal theory of corporations
intrudes itself to render undesirable many results which would
ensue from the application of the law of Agency and the rules
of Evidence. Since courts have confused the theories under-
lying the law of Agency with those of the law of Evidence, it
is not surprising, when Corporation law overlaps Agency, to find
them confounding both Agency and Corporation law with rules
of Evidence. To present a concrete problem: at 5 P. M., A is
injured in a factory. At 5.03 P. M., B, general manager, on
being informed of the accident, makes to his clerk, C, certain
statements damaging to the interests of the defendant corpo-
ration. At 5.30 P. M., X, a reporter, asks D, president of the
board, the cause of the accident. D refers X to B, the general
manager. At 5.45 P. M., after working hours, B is interviewed
on the street car by X and repeats the words previously spoken
to C. At 8 P. M., at his club, B reiterates the words to E, F, and
and G, three distinterested persons. C dies before the trial, X
leaves the jurisdiction, but B is retained as general manager.
From this set. of facts arise issues which involve nice questions
of Agency and Corporation law, as well as rules of Evidence,
and questions upon the answer to which may largely depend A's
right to recover damages.
Anciently, and more especially in the sixteenth 'century, it
seems that substantially all words spoken by one person to a third
party were admissible in a matter under adjudication. 2 All ad-
missions and declarations of agents were competent. Following
this there came a reversal of practice whereby substantially all
declarations and admissions of agents to third persons were ex-
cluded as mere hearsay.3 Obviously neither practice could be
satisfactory. Neither wholesale admissibility nor total exclusion
was adequate to meet the requirements of the judicial process
nor the dictates of common sense. Little by little the doors were
' See WIGmoE, CASES ON EvIDENcE (2d ed. I913) 547.
'See 2 WImoRE, EvmENcE (2d ed. 1923) 585, § IO78, n. z. Cf. Lord Ken-
yon in Maesters v. Abram, i Esp. 375 (1795). Cf. also Sir William Grant in
Fairlie v. Hastings, supra note r.
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again opened to admit certain statements of agents to third per-
sons. This was brought about under the doctrine of exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Declarations were admissible under this
new device, first, when they were shown to have been authorized;
second, when consent had been given in advance, as by contract; 4
third, when they were a part of the res gestce.
Under the first theory, that of authorization, there may
have been general authority or special authority. In either case
the authority must be shown before the declarations are admis-
sible." It may be express or implied from the facts and circum-
stances of the case, but the agent's own statements that he has
been authorized are not admissible.8 The existence of the re-
lationship of agency is a question of fact for the jury. So also,
it would seem, as to the character of the agency and its extent to
include the declarations sought to be admitted. The questions
involved, it is seen, are primarily those of the substantive law
of Agency, rather than rules of Evidence.
7
The admission of declarations, consent to which was founded
in contract, was permitted in an early English case where a deputy
sheriff gave a bond to his chief, the sheriff, to save him harmless
in the event of his misconduct.8 The deputy committed an illegal
act in the course of his official duty. The deputy made certain
admissions to third parties and the question arose whether the
admissions were competent to bind the sheriff. It was held that
they were. The sheriff had required and accepted the bond,
thereby charging himself with whatever his deputy might do.
'For the sake of analysis, it seems best to have regard for these three types
of admissions of agents, although the first two classes may seem to be substan-
tially the same, as opposed to the third, which arises in connection With tort
liability.
' The fact of agency must be proved first. Livingston M'f'g. Co. v. Rizzi,
86 Vt 419, 85 Ad. 912 (1913). See 2 WIGmORE, supra note 3 at 587. But see
Central Penn. Tel. etc. Co. v. Thompson, 112 Pa. 118, 3 At. 439 (1886). Cf.
Buist v. Guice, 96 Ala. 255, ii So. 28o (1892) ; Campbell v. Sherman, 49 Mich.
534, 14 N. W. 484 (1883).
'Union Trust Co. v. Robinson, 70 Fed. 42o (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Howe
Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan. 492 (1875). See also Irwin v. Buckaloe, 12 S.
& R. 35 (Pa. 1824). The agent may testify directly, of course, as to his agency.
See 2 WIGMOPX, supra note 3 at 588.
' Cf. 2 WiGmoRE, supra note 3 at 585.
'Yabsley v. Doble, i Ld. Raym. 191 (1697).
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The court was looking at the effect of its decision. "For though
the sheriff is suable," it was said, "yet the under-sheriff gives
him a bond to save him harmless, and therefore it will all fall
upon him. And therefore his confession is good, because in
effect it charges himself."
In Snowball v. Goodricke,9 Alderson, J., excluded declara-
tions made by a deputy for no apparent reason other than that
the deputy had gone out of office. The inference is that the dec-
larations would have been admitted had the deputy still been in
the sheriff's employ. It is not easy to reconcile the reasoning
here with that in Yabsley v. Doble, for the bond was still effec-
tive, albeit the deputy was out of office. It is clear, however,
that the declarations of the under-sheriff are not admissible on
the grounds of his being the general officer of the sheriff.10
Perhaps the most outstanding exception involved in this
problem is the doctrine of res geste. Were the words uttered a
part of the thing done? If they were near enough in point of
time so that they might be regarded as spontaneous, rather than
the result of deliberation and contrivance, they might be admitted
as competetit and relevant. If not, they must be excluded as
incompetent and as hearsay. Here was a doctrine which con-
stituted one of the earliest exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Now to what extent do these grounds for the admissibility
of such declarations apply to corporations? It has been held that
on principle there should be no difference in the application of
the rules between corporations and individuals. A principal is
such whether an individual or a corporation."' On the other
hand, because of the artificial nature of the corporation, it may
be argued that the same degree of rigidity in application to cor-
porations ignores some of the fundamental assumptions of cor-
poration law. The doctrine indicated above as consent by con-
tract may well be applied to the one as to the other. The nature
of the corporate entity together with its anomalous relation to
'4 Bar. & Ad., 541 (1833).
" See a good note on this matter in i GamaNLAF, op. cit. supra note i,
§ i8o, n. 5.
21 See, for example, McEntire v. Levi Cotton Mills Co., 132 N. C. 598,
44 S. E. 109 (1903).
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the business world makes the res geste doctrine difficult of appli-
cation, and many curious and interesting results have followed.
The task of determining whether words spoken were a part
of the res gestT is never an easy one, whether the doctrine apply
to individuals or to corporations. One difficulty arises from the
constant query: when, in point of time, must the statement be
made to be res gestca? Here the courts have been, and are, hope-
lessly divided. Some hold to what is known as the strict rule
that declarations must have been contemporaneous with the thing
done, so that they become "verbal acts," intimately connected
with the physical acts, thus insuring that the declarant have no
opportunity to deliberate and to concoct. a statement advanta-
geous to himself, disadvantageous to the adverse party. Other
courts, and apparently the minority, hold to what may be de-
scribed, for want of a better term, the "sphere of influence"
theory. By this is meant that declarations made after the event,
which are so close in point of time that they "may be deemed"
to have been uttered while the declarant was under the excite-
ment and influence of the thing done, so that they are, in effect,
equivalent to spontaneous statements, are as likely to be true and
reliable as though they were contemporaneous with the acts. The
reason for the exclusion failing, of course, the rule fails, and
such declarations are admitted. While the strict application of
the rule may be made in the majority of cases, the more liberal
theory which extends the scope of the doctrine to include declara-
tions made when they can be fairly adjudged to be within the
sphere of influence of the acts done, seems more satisfactory,
both in reason and in the satisfactory nature of the results
* reached.'
2
In enforcing the rule strictly, the fallacies of the courts'
reasoning are aptly illustrated by the fictions devised to bolster
up the decisions. Many courts are unwilling to rest the decision
upon the grounds that the declarations were too remote, in point
of time, to be a part of the res gestce. They are more content
to urge that the reason that the statements are not a part of the
res gestcr is because they are narrative, and thus, untrust-
" See 3 WiGMomm, supra note 3, § 1750.
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worthy.18 All verbal acts are, of course, narrative, unless they
are made before the act, when they might serve to prove the in-
tention or state of mind of the speaker in his subsequent act;
or at the exact instant of the act, when they are literally "spon-
taneous." An explosion of gunpowder takes place, or a collision
of vehicles occurs, causing a woman to scream. This, perhaps, is
res gestce,' but even here the exclamation occurs after the act or
event, and is consequently narrative. The real question which
courts so frequently fail to answer is whether or not the state-
ments are made under such circumstances as would make it rea-
sonable to rely upon them.
To become proper evidence, the statements need only be
close enough in point of time, under all the circumstances of the
case, to leave insufficient opportunity for contrivance. If, in
view of all the circumstances, the words used are in logical se-
quence and so connected with the act or events that neither is
intelligible without the other, there is every reason for admitting
them both. "It depends," said Mr. Justice Swayne in a Supreme
Court case, "upon the circumstances as well as the expressions
used. In the complexity of human affairs, what is done and what
is said are often so related that neither can be detached without
leaving the residue fragmentary and distorted. There may be
fraud and falsehood as to both; but there is no ground of ob-
jection to one that does not exist equally as to the other. To
reject the verbal fact would not infrequently have the same effect
as to strike out the controlling member of a sentence, or the con-
trolling sentence from its context . . .The tendency of recent
adjudications is to extend rather than to narrow the scope of
the doctrine." 14
'Cf. Fairlie v. Hastings, supra note i; Packet Co. v. Clough, 20 Wall.
528 (r874).
' See Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, 4o8 (1869). A few typical
examples of the res gestT application follow. Majority rule: Boyd. v. West
Chicago St. Ry., 112 Ill. App. 5o (i9o4), a conductor fell from a street car.
The motorman ran the car a block or so, then back to the place where the con-
ductor fell. In the meantime, the latter regained his feet The answer of the
conductor to the motorman's question as to how he happened to fall was ex-
cluded, although but a minute or two had elapsed. It was said to be narrative
and hence hearsay. In Bedingfield's Case, 14 Cox. C. C. 341 (1879), a woman
with her throat cut came running from a house and made certain statements as
to who had done the act and as to how it was done. In ten minutes she died.
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It would seem that since a corporation can be dealt with
only through its agents, the application of the res gesta' doctrine
should be further extended with respect to corporations. 15 After
all, corporations differ from individuals in law."6 The law has
created the legal personality of the corporation for the sake of
convenience in certain phases of its activities. It should not
overlook the fiction in others. In every case, however, the atti-
tude of the court will determine whether the rule of res gestae
shall be applied strictly, or whether the principles underlying that
rule shall render its application more liberal, and perhaps, more
realistic.
To return to the problem, what disposition must be made
of B's declarations as a part of the res gestce, were C alive to
give them? This would, as has been pointed out, be dependent
upon which of the two applications of the res gestae doctrine the
court adopted. If it were partial to the strict rule, three minutes
removed would be fatal for the statements would be too far re-
moved, in point of time, from the accident to permit the state-
ments to be admitted.17 If, on the other hand, the court leaned
Her declarations were not admitted as dying declarations nor as coming within
the res gestae doctrine, although the statements had been made within the space
of i minute from the time when the crime had been admitted. In Parker v.
State, 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. E. iio5 (893), a druggist had been shot. His wife,
who had been in the store but a few minutes before, was not permitted to testify
to statements made by her husband within a minute from the time when he was
shot. In Brauer v. New York City etc. R. R., 131 App. Div. 682, ii6 N. Y.
Supp. 59 (1909), the remark of a motorman that "he bothered me all the way
across the bridge" was excluded as hearsay, although made within five seconds
of the time of the accident.
Illustrations of the broader "'sphere of influence" application: Railroad v.
McLane, Ii D. C. App. 220 (1897), where statements of a boy injured by a
street car were admitted although made about ten minutes after the accident,
but while he was still lying on the track. In Krogg v. Atlantic & West Point
R. R-, 77 Ga. 22 (i886), the statement of a general manager of a railroad
made fourteen hours after the accident was admissible as res geste. In Walters
v. International R. R., 58 Wash. 293, io8 Pac. 593 (19io), the statements of a
conductor were admitted two hours after the accident, and after he had run a
mile from the spot where the accident occurred. They were res gestae. In
Malecek v. Tower Grove R. R., 57 Mo. 17 (1874), statements made three days
after the event were regarded as res geste, and admitted as such. In Morse v.
Conn. P. L, 6 Gray 450 (Mass. x856), the "continuing act" doctrine was grafted
on to res gestcr, to make admissible statements uttered the morning after the
disappearance of certain baggage from the railroad's custody.
See 2 THOMPSON, CoRpoRATIONS (2d ed. i9o9) § 622.
"Cf. the non-applicability to corporations of the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
'TCf. Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112 (1882).
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toward the sphere of influence notion, the statements would not
necessarily be excluded as being made too long after the event.1 s
But C is dead, and the res gestce question is, therefore, elimi-
nated. X is not available as a witness, and his testimony cannot
be procured. Perhaps his testimony is not admissible if he were
present, as D, the president of the board, may not have had au-
thority, either general or special, to refer X to B. There only re-
mains the statements of B to E, F, and G, the three indifferent
persons. The statements to these three were made in a casual
manner while B was not engaged in the performance of a duty
connected with his relationship to the corporation. Upon the
ordinary construction of rules of Evidence, under these circum-
stances B's statements are inadmissible, not having been made
within the courSe of his duty 9 and the declarant having no au-
thority to make them.
20
In view of this situation, the question is pertineni whether
the well recognized rules of Evidence are adequate to produce
sound or desirable results, and, if not, does legal theory have
available any other doctrine whereby more satisfactory results
can be attained. It is at this stage that the overlapping of Cor-
poration law is significant. A great deal of confusion in this
type of case, it is submitted, results from the failure to apply the
rules of the different branches of the law which are involved.
Some courts seem inclined to hold that declarations of managing
agents are controlled exclusively by rules of Evidence. Others
lean toward the doctrines of Agency, while still others regard
the situation as completely within the realm of Corporation law.
It seems obvious, however, that no one of these views is pro-
ductive of proper results. Corporation law should apply to such
phases of the question as lie peculiarly within the province of the
legal theory of corporations. The relation of the corporation,
Cf. Morse v. Conn. etc. R. R., Malecek v. Tower Grove R. R., both s'upra
note 14.
"Central Electric Co. v. Sprague Co., I2O Fed. 925 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902);
Blanchard-Carlisle Co. v. Garretson, 43 Ind. App. 303, 87 N. E. 151 (i9O9);
McMillan v. Carson Hill etc. Co., 12 Phila. 404 (1878); Tyng v. Constant-
Loraine Inv. Co., 47 Utah 330, 154 Pac. 767 (i916).
= Brackett v. Commonwealth, 223 Mass. iig, ixi N. E. 1036 (i9x6);
Haney-Campbell Co. v. Preston Creamery, iig Iowa I88, 93 N. W. 297 (1903).
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as a legal personality, to its agents and the legal status of the lat-
ter are included within this province. How, then, is that rela-
tionship described and delimited, and what effect does it have
upon the present problem of admissibility of the declarations of
general corporate agents?
Salmond, in his work on Jurisprudence, suggests that "it is
held that the law will not only impute to the corporation all acts
which its representatives are lawfully authorized to do, but all
acts which they do in or about the business so authorized." 21
This phrase in or about is freighted with great significance. In
our problem we have a piece of machinery used in the business of
the corporation. The officers directed or permitted this use. The
machinery is defective and known to be so. By a positive order
or act the managing agent, with knowledge of the defects and
the consequent danger, caused the continuance in use of this
machine, or by a negative act suffers its continued use. The
"corporation," of course, knows nothing of this positive order or
negative suffrance. Yet, by orthodox corporation law, the cor-
poration should be bound by the doctrine of imputed knowledge,
and therefore imputed assent to the use of the crane. The sub-
stantive law, determining tort liability, is clear. Now, when the
accident occurs, the manager makes a statement tending to prove
this knowledge on his part, and hence on the part of the corpo-
ration. The accident occurred "in and about" the business
which he, the managing agent, is authorized to control. The tort
committed renders the corporation liable; why then does not the
declaration thus made bind the corporation? If the casual in-
.strument was used in the business, why should not the declaration
of the managing agent of that business concerning the casual
instrument be admitted in evidence? Why does this not involve
questions of substantive law of as vital importance as those which
fix the corporation's liability for the tort in the first instance? 22
'JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 347. See State v. Armour, i73 Mo. 356,
73 S. W. 645, 650 (903).
If the general question depends upon the doctrine of Agency and not upon
any rule of Evidence, this particular phase of the question depends upon the law
of Corporations and not upon any rule of Evidence.
io UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The information from one who is in a position to know the
cause of the accident, such as the managing agent of the corpo-
ration, should be admitted, it seems, first, providing it was di-
vulged "in or about" the business; and provided, second, that it
has the color of circumstantial genuineness. 2 3 But, it is objected,
the law assumes that such testimony is unreliable because, at best,
it is hearsay. If this contention be conceded, under the circum-
stances of this case, we have the defendant corporation in the
embarrassing position of repudiating the statements of its spokes-
man and insisting that, although the managing agent made the
oath to verify the pleadings in the present .action, and now di-
rects the defence during the prosecution of the trial, still his
statements shortly after learning of the accident are so untrust-
worthy and unreliable that they cannot be admitted in evidence.
Morawetz, in his work on Corporations, has observed as fol-
lows:
"The doctrine in respect of the relations of principal and
agent, and master and servant, as applicable to the acts and
contracts of corporations, are well established. It is essential
to an act or contract which binds the corporation that it be
done, or entered into, or authorized by the corporation en-
tity itself, as represented by the governing board of stock-
holders."
"It is well recognized in the law that corporations, in
carrying out corporate functions, may, and of necessity do
create vice principals who, in respect of the departments
of corporate business intrusted to their control and. general
management, partake of the corporate entity, and their acts
and contracts, in execution of the functions they represent,
are of the same effect and import as if done and entered
into, or directly authorized, by a vote of the governing board
of stockholders. Such a person in reference to the public, is
more than a mere agent acting.under orders of a superior.
He is pro hac vice a principal. He stands for, and repre-
sents within the sphere of his authority the corporate entity
itself." 24
2See 2 WHARTON, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1888) § 1177.
" Op. cit. (2d ed. 1886) § 725.
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Corporate law, creating corporate entities, contemplates
managing officers who shall act and speak for the corporation.
Out of the very nature of the corporate person this is the only
way in which it can act and speak. Having no eyes, no ears nor
hands, it sees, hears and acts only in law, and in law through
natural persons. The law creates the entity as a legal person,
permits or compels it to take a name, empowers it to enter the
world of business and industry, and insists that it name some
individual or individuals as officers who shall speak for it and act
in its stead. This situation is, it is obvious, peculiar to corporate
law.
Now that other person or persons, the officer or officers
named in the charter or required by the state to be named in the
by-laws, is no mere agent, in the ordinary sense. Consequently,
the ordinary rules of Agency should not apply to determine his
relationship to the corporation and the binding effect of his dec-
larations upon the corporation. He is, indeed the corporation's
alter ego, its second self.2 5 It is true, of course, that the corpora-
tion can, and frequently does, act through agents, in the accepted
meaning of that term. But in every act done by or in behalf of
the corporation, the latter may be present by alter ego or "other
self," or the act may be done by representation and the corpora-
tion be present in the same way, through an agent. If by the for-
mer method, the act is done by the corporation per se; if by the
latter, it is done per alium. There is a difference, and the differ-
ence is that in the one case the corporation acts directly; in the
latter case, indirectly.
This doctrine is familiar in the substantive law of Corpora-
tions, and is forcibly enunciated in a recent New Jersey case in
the following language:
"Take for instance when a corporation makes a deed,
the corporation grantor must make an acknowledgment be-
fore a notary public the same as any other grantor. How
will it be done? By the proper officer of the corporation.
His act is not the act of himself but the act of the corpora-
tion. He is not an agent for the corporation. He is the
Cf. the language of McCardie, J., in Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K. B. 497.
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corporation. The former would be per alium. The latter is
per se. This distinction is fundamental. One goes to the
law of principal and agent. The other to corporation
law." 26
Is this not a realistic way of regarding corporations? Ii im-
putes to them the attributes of legal personality, yet abandons
the notion that they are ideal, intangible beings by treating them
as organizations of men, created for certain purposes, but with
officers, required by law, through whose acts the corporation
itself acts, the things done being regarded as proceeding directly
and immediately from the corporation.27  In a Canadian case
it was said that "when an officer of a corporation makes an affi-
davit, he does not act as an agent. He exercises the corporate
powers in the only way in which they can be exercised at all. He
acts in chief and not by delegation." 28
Thus, a New York court, considering the sufficiency of an
affidavit, said:
"It (the affidavit) is made by the general and manag-
ing agent . . . It would be indefensible to preclude a corpo-
ration.from the benefits of this act of Congress by insisting
on an affidavit from itself which cannot be made, 'or by deny-
ing its petition because none was made by it. It may be
made by any person acting under the authority of the cor-
poration, and possessed of the needed knowledge or infor-
mation to make it . . .This affiant swears that he is the
managing agent . . . This is proof, pro hac vice, that he
had the means of knowing the material facts stated in the
petition." 29
Many further illustrations of this theory may be recalled.
It is thus, through individuals, acting, not for, but as the corpo-
ration, that they may commit all manner of torts such as assault
See American Soda Fountain Co. v. Stolgenbach, 75 N. J. L. 721, 68 At.
1o78 (igo8).
2Cf. the cases in which the law removes the "corporate mask" or "pierces
the corporate veil."
Bank v. McDougel, 15 U. C. C. P. 475 (Canada, 1865).
Shaft v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 544, 549 (1876). Cf. the language
used in Bank v. Hutchinson etc., 87 N. C. 36, 37 (1882).
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and battery,30 malicious prosecution, 31 false imprisonment,
32
libel,3 3 slander,34 and some offenses for which they may be in-
dicted. It was never thought that a corporate vote was necessary
to bind a corporation for such wrongs, especially within the past
hundred years. As well might be said that a corporate vote were
necessary to give express authority to every contract made by
the managing agent, although the ordinary doctrine of Agency
would take care of many contracts.
This same distinction between acts of the corporation when
done for the corporation by the managing agent, and when con-
summated through the managing agent by the corporation, is
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. The
question of intent seems to figure in the opinion. The Court has
said:
"Any damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the acts of the agents of the defendant corporation in the
scope of their agency is allowed, but punitive damages is for
punishment for intentional wrongdoing. The defendant
must be shown to have participated or ratified the wrong-
doing. This participation can be done by the general man-
aging officers or by the board by official acts." 35
But the same objection is raised to this theory, which is
grounded exclusively upon legal doctrines peculiar to the law
of Corporations, as is raised in the case of declarations of ordi-
nary agents acting for a principal. There is no authority to do
the acts nor to make the declarations pertaining to those acts.
The fallacy is obvious. It is due to an effort to apply Agency
law to a problem of Corporation law. In the latter, the question
of authority is involved only to determine the general field within
which the acts and declarations of the managing agent constitute
acts and declarations of the corporation itself. This matter once
determined, authority to perform the particular act is not neces-
sary, or, in otherwords, it is imputed from his position as man-
" Passenger R. R. v. Young, 21 Ohio 518 (1871).
'Goodspeed v. Bank, 22 Conn. 531 (1853).
"Conklin v. Consolidated R. R., 196 Mass. 302, 82 N. E. 23 (1907).
South etc. Alabama R. R. v. Chapell, 6I Ala. 527 (1878).
"Empire Cream Separator Co. v. DeLaval etc. Supply Co., 75 N. J. L. 207,
67 Atl. 711 (1907).
"Lake Shore etc. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. iO (1893).
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aging agent.3 6 It is only consistent with the legal theory of
Corporations that the same reasoning be applied to declarations
of such general officers made under the same circumstances.
It is another objection frequently raised to the admissibility
of such declarations that they were not made in the line of, or
during the period of the duty of, the declarant. But the same
objection could as readily be made to his tortious acts, for it is
hardly to be presumed that the commission of torts or of negli-
gent acts is contemplated as being within the agent's duty. 7 It
is difficult to understand just what is intended by this objection
with reference to declarations of general corporate officers such
as managing agents. Sometimes it means that the admissions
were made out of time, that is, that they were not made .while
the manager was on duty,38 or that they were not made with
reference to or at the time of the particular transaction. 9 But
one is tempted to inquire whether a managing agent is ever "off
duty." In the event of emergency or of sudden and uiforeseen
peril and danger to the factory or to corporation property, the
general manager finds his duties as onerous and as definite as
though he were sitting at his desk in the middle of the day. Not
only are his duties, under the circumstances, clear and unmis-
takable, but his authority is just as explicit and just as certain.
It is refreshing to observe that a few courts have taken a realistic
view of the "off duty" question.
In a Georgia case,40 the general manager of a railroad com-
"Cf. Citizens Gas & Electric Co. v. Black, 95 Ohio St. 42, 115 N. E. 495
(19 6).
"Cf. the language of Warrington, L. J., in Jefferson v. Derbyshire Farmers
Ltd., [1921] 2 K. B. 281.
UCf. Huntingdon etc. R. R. v. Decker, 82 Pa. iig (876), confining admis-
sions of agents to the "time of the particular transaction" and declaring that
"the declarations of officers of a corporation rest upon the same principle as
apply to other agents." Cf. also Rickets v. Birmingham St. Ry., 85 Ala. 6oo,
5 So. 353 (I889).
' Bank of Brocton v. Brocton Fruit Juice Co., 2o8 N. Y. 49Z, io2 N. E. 591
(913), involving declarations made by the president of a bank. This'decision
reversed the Appellate Division, which had held that the declarations were
admissible. "In my opinion," said the court, "the evidence was clearly compe-
tent, and it is sufficient to say that Hall (the defendant), at the time he made
the statements which are in evidence, was an officer, to wit, president, of the
plaintiff." I
" Krogg v. Atlantic & West Point R. R., 77 Ga. 2= (x886).
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pany had left his office and gone "off duty." Instead of being
at his home or club, however, he was in bed in a car, presumably
a Pullman, sound asleep. He was just as much off duty. it must
be remarked, as though he were at his home, at the theatre, or at
his club. The conductor entered the coach, awakened him and
informed him of the wreck of another train at a certain place
many miles away. "I told the roadmaster," exclaimed the gen-
eral manager, "that the track was too high at that curve." Now
the facts are not clear whether the managing agent was, at the
time, on a journey in the interest of the company or whether he
was engaged in a purely private enterprise. It is only reasonable
to believe, therefore, that it was immaterial to the court. The
declaration was admitted on the ground that it was in the line
of duty and within the scobe of the officer's employment, and the
reason assigned was that it was his duty and his business to know
the condition of the road, whether technically on duty or not.
The court seems to proceed on the assumption that the managing
officer is never off duty with respect to affairs of corporate busi-
ness which he has under his control and management. If this
premise be a valid one, it completely disposes of the objection so
frequently interposed that declarations are not made while the
declarer was acting within the line of his-duty, or at the exact
time that the act to which the declaration pertains took place.
Proceeding now upon the legal theory as to the nature of
corporations, as determined and adopted in Corporation law, and
regarding the "line of duty" and "scope of employment" question
in a way consistent with that theory, it follows that such declar-
ations as we are concerned with in our specific problem may find
a ready avenue of admission through the application of ordinary
and orthodox rules of evidence. The words of the manager to
his friends at the club, being the words of the corporation itself,
are but the simple admissions of a party, against his own interest,
and are admissible as such. They are available as competent
evidence against the corporation only, which, of course, is not true
of declarations which are a part of the res gesta. Thus the chief
reason employed in the strict application of the res gestce doctrine,
time for contrivance, is not invoked against such declarations.
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A principal himself can always bind himself by his acts and
by his declarations, both in season and out of season, with respect
to his own legal affairs. It follows, if the foregoing reasoning
is accurate, that a corporate principal is able to do the same thing
with respect to the acts and declarations made by the managing
agent "in or about" the business which the law created the cor-
porate principal to conduct. This means that the managing
agent can bind the corporation within the limits of the business
of the corporation. Anything said by him relative to that busi-
ness is within the scope of his authority and in the line of his
duty, for in respect to such business, he is the corporation. In
other words, the line of his duty is determined by the law which
creates the corporation, not by the number of hours per day which
he ordinarily serves the corporation. Obviously he, as the cor-
poration's "second self," could not act and make declarations
about acts which were wholly outside the authorized business
which the corporation was empowered to transact. But under
these circumstances, not only the general manager, but the board
as well, is impotent to make declarations binding upon the cor-
poration, for such statements, as the acts to which they pertain,




In an Oregon case,42 both a corporation and its president
were made defendants in a suit for slander. The plaintiff had
been accused of theft from the company's store. The president,
who was also general manager of the store, a corporation, had
made the slanderous remarks complained of. Declarations of
the president were sought to be introduced in evidence. Their
admission was objected to as hearsay. The court ruled that they
were admissible as declarations against interest.43 The corpora-
tion defendant failed to ask for instructions limiting the operation
of the rule to the president, personally, and the case must be
"National Home Building etc., Assn. v. Bank, 181 Ill. 35, 54 N. E. 61g
(1899). But cf. the rule as to torts. See Hussey v. King, 98 N. C. 34, 3 S. E.
923 (1887).
Bingham v. Lipman, Wolfe & Co., 40 Ore. 363, 369, 67 Pac. 98 (igoi).
"The court refers to these admissions as "declarations against interest," but
treats them, apparently, as "admissions," or as primary evidence.
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regarded as applying the principle to corporations as well. Just
how much weight is to be attached to this decision, in view of
the joinder of parties defendant, may be problematical, but in
Southern R. R. Co. v. Howell,44 the application of the rule of
declarations against interest cannot be denied. The superinten-
dent of the defendant company had written a letter to a party in
adverse interest, saying: "It is my understanding that we own
50 feet on each side of the main track." At the trial of the issue,
it was objected that the introduction of this letter violated rules
of evidence. The court overruled the objection, holding it within
the officer's authority and being in the nature of an admission
against interest. In another case, an admission in writing by the
secretary and general manager of a corporation that certain sums
were due the plaintiff for services rendered, was received in evi-
dence as an admission against interest. It was a declaration of
the general manager with respect to the business of the corpora-
tion, and consequently it was the declaration of the corporation
itself.
45
From these cases there is some indication that the courts at
times recognize the fact that a corporation can make no admission
against interest unless the same falls from the lips of an alter ego,
acting and speaking "in or about" the business which the corpora-
tion is empowered by law to conduct, and which the alter ego is
empowered to control.
Fixed rules of evidence are the result of a growth of the law
extending through centuries and-are, no doubt, justified by the
stability given to the legal system and the judicial process. This
stability is necessary to the effective functioning of our judicial
machinery. On the other hand, as society progresses and as
business is carried on by corporations in increasing volume, there
seems to be a demand for the relaxing of hard and rigid rules,
especially where the reason for the rule has partially or wholly
failed. This demand can be met by a sound judicial discretion
in giving careful consideration to the rules in the light of ortho-
dox corporation law and theory, controlled by the facts and cir-
cumstances of each individual case as it arises. There can be no
"79 S. C. 28r, 6o S. E. 677 (i9o8).
" Smith v. Sinbad Development Co., ii Cal. App. 253, IO4 Pac. 7o6 (r99).
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objection to the use made of the rules of evidence which the com-
mon law has developed. It is the abuse of these rules that pro-
duces the unsatisfactory results. When the legal theory of cor-
porations is completely ignored, and the reasons for rules of evi-
dence overlooked for the purpose of applying the rule itself, lit-
erally, it seems justifiable to conclude that the rules have been
abused. Rules misapplied are perhaps worse than no rules at all,
for they cramp the discretion of the court and defeat the very
purpose of their origin. Similarly, legal theory misinterpreted
and misdirected is bound to produce results both unsatisfactory
in effect and unsound in logic.
In this connection, it has been said by an eminent judge:
"It is because I believe that the reason back of most of
these rules is sound that I feel that they should not be aban-
doned but should be applied whenever the reason does not
fail. When the reason does fail then there should be a way
to at least relax the rigor of the rule."
"In the development of our system of evidence there
are three courses possible: our .present system may be con-
tinued and the rules become even more definite and rigid;
the rules may be abolished and all evidence of a probative
force received, as in arbitrations or hearings by certain ad-
ministrative boards; or a field for the exercise of judicial
discretion may be created where it can be demonstrated that
rigid application of the rules is unreasonable." 46
In our problem of the admission of declarations of manag-
ing agents of corporations, the last course suggested above is the
only one to relieve the trouble encountered with respect to the
res gestw rule. It is necessary to have regard for the reasonable-
ness of the rule as applied to the circumstances of the particular
case, in order, frankly, to achieve a desirable result and one not
inconsistent with the reason underlying the rule itself. In the
application of the "scope of authority" and "line of duty" doc-
trines, it is submitted that a true regard for the legal theory un-
derlying the substantive law of Corporations will solve many
difficulties. This, together with more extended use of the admis-
sions-against interest rule, it is believed, will avoid many of the
absurd results of the hearsay rule.
'Lehman, Technical Rules of Evidence, (1926) 26 Cor- L. REv. 5o9.
